

**A study of Machiavellism: Were de Gaulle and Kekkonen
Machiavellian?**

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Utdrag

Denna uppsats är om modern machiavellism och hur den kan bli tillämpad när det är frågan om historia. Vad vi kommer att göra i denna uppsats, är att vi skapar en modern version av traditionel machiavellism, som vi kommer sedan att tillämpa på två specifika fall av statsmän från förra århundradet. Dessa fall är Charles de Gaulle och Urho Kekkonen, för att båda har gjort extremt kontroversiella beslut som har orsakat kritik och det är dessa beslut som vi kommer att undersöka med hjälp av vår modell. Själva modellen som vi kommer att tillämpa är delad i två delar, var varje del består av ett specifikt område av machiavellism, i vårt fall hur man kommer till makten och hur man säkrar den. Denna fokuserade infallsvinkel kommer tyvärr också att vara uppsatsens svaghet för att den kan inte ge en perfekt helhetsbild av fallen om vi tar i beaktande olika tolkningar av machiavellism eller om vi utvidgar undersöknings området.

Även om uppsatsen har sina svagheter, kan vi dra vissa slutsatser av både de Gaulle och Kekkonen när det är frågan om machiavellism enligt vår modell. Både de Gaulle och Kekkonen använde sig av mediet för att svartmåla sina politiska motståndare och för att förstärka sitt eget rykte. Dessutom använde de också den extremt machiavelliska metoden av att bli av med sina politiska motståndare och även detta var inte tillräckligt för dem. Båda använde också utomstående hot för att försvara sina beslut, vilket också är ett väldigt machiavelliskt drag.

Annars finns det stora olikheter i hur dessa statsmän utnyttjade metoderna. De Gaulle använde ofta machiavelliska metoder när han steg till makten, när Kekkonen började istället använda dessa metoder först efter att han hade kommit till makten, inte före som var fallet med de Gaulle.

Från dessa ovannämnda bevis och det faktum att denna uppsats är bara om ett specifikt område av deras karriär, kan vi dra den slutsatsen att båda männen var machiavelliska när det är frågan om hur de kom till makten och hur de säkrade den.

Abstract

This essay is about modern Machiavellism, which is still an actual issue in politics even if it has already passed 500 years since Machiavelli wrote his famous works. Hence, I am going to create a model of it and apply it to two statesmen of the 20th century, Charles de Gaulle and Urho Kekkonen, to see if they were Machiavellian. In both cases we will focus on their rise to power and how they consolidated it, since Machiavellism is very strong in these areas when an authoritarian person rises to power.

Both of the cases were chosen on the basis that both of these rulers have been controversial in their methods in such a way that they have raised critics against them. The only limitations of this essay are that as only two focused parts of the cases are being studied, it is impossible to obtain a perfect understanding of whether they were Machiavellian or not.

Both de Gaulle and Kekkonen used extensively the media to discredit their opponents and to increase their reputation. They also used the highly Machiavellian method of removing rivals from political positions when they rose to power and the threat of a foreign intervention to justify their rule, though it was more extensive in Kekkonen's case. After this their methods differ, de Gaulle used extensive Machiavellian methods when he rose to power, with the threat of a coup d'etat hastening his election, while Kekkonen started to use those methods after he had gained the power.

However, different interpretations of Machiavelli or extending the scope of the essay might challenge the interpretations presented in this essay about those methods that were used, but as far as this essay is concerned, both de Gaulle and Kekkonen were Machiavellian in their methods.

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1. Introduction

The term Machiavellian has been used since the sixteenth century to describe a person who is ready to do everything to achieve his goal and it has gotten a sinister reputation since it was condemned by other political writers in the 16th and early 17th century.¹ Even nowadays the term is used to describe a ruthless action or some dubious statesmen. But how correct are these statements about a person being Machiavellian in the true sense that Machiavelli meant? To investigate this problem we are going to study two statesmen, Urho Kekkonen and Charles de Gaulle, who have been claimed by some people to be Machiavellian in their methods and determine if they really were. But how can we determine what is Machiavellian and what is not, if its meaning has turned more vague since the first century after his death?

The only way we can tackle this problem is by creating a modern model of what Machiavellism is, which can then be applied to history. To do that we have to read several of his works, mainly *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, and to consult several prominent political writers' works in which they deal with Machiavellism from a more neutral point of view than the traditional stance that any amoral actions can be considered Machiavellian, since Machiavellism can be more subtle than that, especially in modern society where propaganda and deception play a greater role than the traditional Machiavellian solution of using questionable methods.

The model in question that we are going to create will consist of two parts: the rise to power of the statesman and how he consolidated his power. In each part as mentioned above we are going to use the advice that Machiavelli presented in his works for certain problems and turn it into modern form in a way that the original purpose remains the same. Once we have formed the model, we are going to apply it to our cases, Kekkonen and de Gaulle, and determine whether these persons were Machiavellian or not.

¹ Political writers such as Gentillet, Bodin and Campanella criticized Machiavelli for having no sense of morality in his advise to rulers. Meinecke, *Machiavellism* (Transaction Publishers, 1998) p.49-64, 90-116

2. The Model

This part of the essay is dedicated to the model of modern Machiavellism and how it can be applied to the rise to power and the consolidation of it. What we are going to do here is not to divide the model as it is into two parts, but to look at some aspects of Machiavellism that are eminent today and then to make distinction between them. It is first after this that we are going to divide them between the two categories.

2.1. "Machiavellism is the economy of violence".² The use and the threat of violence

Something that has always been attributed to Machiavelli, is his cynical advice on how violent methods should be used to achieve power or just to keep it. Especially in *The Prince* he puts forth the notion that the best way to rise to power is through personal virtù³ or armed forces,⁴ even if there are other ways to rise to power, such as democratic elections⁵ and deception. Though it is worth noticing that the rise to power doesn't have to be a coup d'etat, it is enough if just the threat of it is enough of to back one's claims to power.⁶

A second aspect where Machiavelli brings forth the aspect of violence is in the consolidation of power, or to be more precise in how to get rid of political opponents and how to ensure that the people will not rebel against you. His advice of getting rid of political opponents and in some cases allies that might gain something from being allied with you is simple. In *The Discourses* he states the only way ensure your power and the well-being of the state, it is necessary "to kill the sons of Brutus".⁷ In modern times it doesn't have to be as brutal as it was in Machiavelli's time, and thus the outright killing can be changed to just removing the persons in questions from their positions in the government or just giving them a remote position from where they cannot do anything. The core

2 Professor Sheldon Wollin as quoted by Bernard Crick in Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (Penguin Classics ,1983) p.30

3 A word that has always been tricky to translate perfectly, but it sufficient to say that it is the ability to do what is necessary for saving your country and achieving glory or as Quentin Skinner put it: "the quality which enables a prince to withstand the blows of Fortune, to attract the goddess's favour, and to rise in consequence to the heights of princely fame, winning honour and glory for himself and security for his government". Skinner, *Machiavelli* (Oxford University Press, 1981) p.35

4 Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.20-23

5 Machiavelli was an ardent supporter of republics as Quentin Skinner states in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1980 1st volume) p.159. Machiavelli, however, did not put much value on persons that rose to power through the help of others since it would make them vulnerable to those who put them to power. He also generally thought that those persons didn't possess the required virtù that should be found in rulers. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.24

6 Here it could be the use of paramilitary forces or outside threats to ensure that one is selected.

7 Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (Penguin Classics ,1983) p.392-393

idea, however, remains the same. This is unfortunately not enough to control the population in a Machiavellian sense and it is in this aspect where the most advice can be found and we will take one of them into consideration in this section. It is the advice on how to keep internal order in *The Prince* where Machiavelli states that to keep order in your own city, you have to make the outside threat greater so that the people will not have time to plot against you due to the foreign threat.⁸

2.2. Of Reputation and Propaganda

In regard to controlling the masses, the importance of reputation appears quite often, especially in *The Prince*, where Machiavelli states how important it is to keep the appearance of being good and noble even if you truly aren't.⁹ Thus deception and propaganda with the aim to make the ruler seem irreplaceable and great for the purpose of keeping him in power or to discredit his opponents, can be seen as Machiavellian when directed to those purposes mentioned above. This is the fact we have to look in modern times, the use of the media to give a certain image or to censure certain things that have to do with the ruler.

2.3. Summary of the Model

So what can we conclude about a Machiavellian rise to power using the information above? It must have at least one of these elements: violence or the threat of it, massive propaganda to enhance the leaders reputation or deception and underhand tricks. The consolidation of power has to in turn include at least one of these to be Machiavellian: removal of political opponents from key positions, propaganda and/or the use of foreign threat to justify and keep oneself in power.

3. De Gaulle: A Decline in Machiavellism

3.1. Foreign Threat and Propaganda

The early political career of Charles de Gaulle after the Second World War was one of cunning Machiavellism, when he used all the possible methods available to him to discredit the constitution of the Fourth Republic and to instead gain support for his own point of view, which was more

⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.42

⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.67-69, 84-87

power to the President instead of the Assembly.¹⁰

His first rise to power was marked by a massive campaign, that had as an objective to turn the masses against the government on the pretext that it did not take into account the possibilities of a possible war that could arise with the Soviet Union.¹¹ In July 1947 his brilliant campaign reached its peak, when he blamed the Communists for planning to hand over France as a satellite to Soviet Union and it is these, some might say false arguments, that eventually allowed de Gaulle's party RPF¹² to win the municipal elections in October 1947.¹³ Following this he called for a very Machiavellian move, which was the dissolving of the Assembly. He did not, however, succeed in this as President Auriol was for status quo and thus an eight year long stalemate occurred between RPF led Assembly and Schuman's¹⁴ government.

This stalemate was then broken in 1955 when de Gaulle realised the futility of his attempt and dissolved the RPF.¹⁵ However, two and a half year later de Gaulle would get a new chance to rise to power with the Algeria Crisis, which he handled in an exemplary way of modern Machiavellism that allowed him to become the leader of France for ten years.

3.2. "And therefore a prophet should be prepared, in case the people will not believe any more, to be able by force to compel them to belief"¹⁶

The Algerian crisis started to escalate at the end of 1957 and it would be the disobedience of the army in the Algeria, which would eventually put de Gaulle in power through his subtle manipulation in the role as an "arbiter" between the Algerian troops and the French government.

10 Even this view of democracy is very Machiavellian as Machiavelli himself promoted the view that a republic should be led by a single person with considerable powers when a country should be restored into its former glory (or in case of emergency) and who is backed by an assembly chosen by the people. He thought that this was for the good of a republic since this arrangement would allow quick reaction to crises instead of the slow decision making of an assembly, which would otherwise do the other things attributed to ruling a country. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1980 1st volume) p.124

11 Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p.324

This can be seen as Machiavellian as it relies on pointing at an outside threat

12 RPF = Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French People)

13 His RPF got 40 % of the seats in the Assembly passing the second greatest party the Communists with 29 %

14 Prime Minister at the time.

15 It was his own RPF that caused his fall from power when it formed paramilitary forces that caused violence in the streets and this eventually led to a drastic decrease in the amount of votes that RPF got in the 1951 elections where it got only 22% of the votes. Unsurprisingly after this defeat the RPF didn't have any more the lever arm to put pressure on the government and thus it declined into a normal political party. Four years later de Gaulle dissolved the party marking the end of his first attempt to rise to power. Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p. 329-331

16 Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.22

So what were the Machiavellian factors that allowed de Gaulle to assume complete power over France during the Algerian crisis? First of all the Ministry of Defence was led by a Gaullist politician,¹⁷ who would make the military look favourably at de Gaulle.

Secondly, there was internal division between the Assembly and the government due to the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakhiet Sidi Youssef on the 8th February 1958. This air raid, which was ordered by the Algerian high command, had acted without order from the government and this in turn made the Communist and the right-wingers to unite in a vote against the government. Due to this voting the government was destabilized and there were several failures before a somewhat successful government under Pleven was formed. This lack of leadership from the government's side in the early period after the vote turned the public opinion in favour of de Gaulle. De Gaulle response to this was complete silence, which would eventually play into his hands.¹⁸ This indecisiveness from the government's part would also escalate the situation in Algeria, where in April 1958 Delbecque¹⁹ and 30 000 other Algerians demonstrated against the government by establishing committees of vigilances. It was not long after this when Pleven resigned as Prime Minister and Pompidou replaced him.

During this time of confusion, Delbecque went to meet de Gaulle in Colombey, where he asked for instructions in the Algerian "uprising". What is sufficient to say is that de Gaulle did not approve or condemn the plan that Delbecque presented, which was a military takeover, since de Gaulle wanted to rise to power through legal means. Still de Gaulle allowed the plans to continue since the threat of violence might play into his hands.²⁰ Following this ambiguous answer Delbecque went back to Algeria, where he managed to convince the military that de Gaulle was the only solution for resolving the critical situation. It was during this time when de Gaulle came out with his announcement that "he was ready to take over the power"(15th May 1958) , which made the government only more resentful towards him. This kind of response from the government would

17 To be more precise, it was Chaban-Delmas who was Minister of Defence and an old member of the RPF. Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p.365

18 Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p.365 . It is however known that de Gaulle knew the situation and that he was patiently watching for a chance to take over the power when the divided government couldn't any more deal with the situation. This use of internal division is a key concept in Machiavellism even if it is more often associated with maintaining power and order in country. Skinner, *Machiavelli* (Oxford University Press, 1981) p.66

19 Delbecque was a also a Gaullist who had been appointed as psychological adviser to the army in Algeria by the Gaullist Minister of Defence in a very Machiavellian manner (i.e. to cause disruption from the inside). Ståhlberg, *De Gaulle, Generalen som var Frankrike* (Norstedts Förlag, 2004) p.364-366

20 This is extremely Machiavellian as Machiavelli devoted a whole chapter to this kind of rise to power in *The Prince*.

only in turn encourage the military to take even more extreme steps and soon there started to circulate rumours that the military was also planning to take over France in the same manner as Algeria with paratroopers making landing on the southern coast. The events took even a more unfortunate turn for the government, when some prominent generals in France announced that they would support de Gaulle.²¹

3.3. A Triumph of Deception

All this planning would eventually converge into the the plan “Résurrection” , which was the invasion of Algerian troops into France and the strategic take-over of Paris with paratroopers. A small glimpse of the coming coup d'etat was seen when some Algerian troops took over Corsica on 24th May and this would be seen as a shift in the political power, since from this point onwards the government could not trust in the support of either the military nor the police.²² This eventually caused Pfmilin to resign in favour of de Gaulle, who would now have only one obstacle in his way before he could take over the power, the Assembly. He needed to have a majority in the Assembly to become the Prime Minister, which in the beginning seemed impossible as both the Socialists and the Communists were against him.

This he dealt with by simply flattering the Socialist leaders that he had invited to Colombey.²³ His rise to power was assured.

3.4. The Removal of Former Allies

The final act de Gaulle did was the removal of his political enemies and uncertain allies in a true Machiavellian manner for his consolidation of power. He so to speak “killed the sons of Brutus”. In his appointment for ministers he appointed several of the old Fourth Republic politicians (Pfmilin for example) to ministerial posts, but also several public servants were named with the purpose of

21 General Maurice Challe had informed that the military would not resist if the army in Algeria would try to take over the power. Ståhlberg, *De Gaulle, Generalen som var Frankrike* (Norstedts Förlag, 2004) p.371-372

22 In the case of operation Resurrection, de Gaulle approved of it as a second choice if he could not rise to power through legal means. He is known to have said to general Salan that “what he will do, is for the good of France”. His whole attitude in his takeover of the power is extremely Machiavellian in many ways, since he used the threat of military force as a backup for him, when he used the methods of coercion to take the power from the internally divided opposition. It is also worth noticing that he defended his actions with them being necessary for the greater good of the country. The theme of *necessita* comes again forth, which is a central theme in Machiavelli as it forces the ruler to take those steps that Machiavelli promotes. It is also one of the foundations of *raison d'etat*. Meinecke, *Machiavellism* (Transaction Publishers, 1998) p.37- 42

23 He managed to convince all of them except Mitterrand, but it was enough for him to win the Assembly vote on 31th May with the Socialists voting 77-74 in his favour

strengthening the image of de Gaulle's policies being unbiased. The true politically ruthless act from him, however, was the deliberate decision to not to give any ministerial posts to the heroes of the uprising, Salan, Delbecque and Massu.²⁴ Still he managed to avoid angering them by giving them military recognitions in form of medals.²⁵

With de Gaulle being appointed as the first President of the Fifth Republic on 8th January 1959, he proceeded to get rid of the Algerian generals for sure. Salan was moved to Paris so that de Gaulle could keep watch on him and 1500 other officers were transferred to other parts of France or were retired, only Massu was allowed to stay as long as he left the Committees of Public Safety.²⁶ Massu would however, be sacked one year later for showing criticism against de Gaulle, when he held his speech about Algerian self-determination. This was not enough for de Gaulle in his strive for securing his position and thus he also sacked Debré²⁷ one year later for his comments on de Gaulle's Algerian policies. At this stage the council of ministers had not much to say in some affairs any more. It was during the same year that de Gaulle achieved total decision power without the consent of the government or parliament on 20th September 1962 when after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on him at Petit-Clamart, he used an interpretation of the new constitution²⁸ that allowed him special temporary emergency powers.²⁹ His Machiavellian rise to power was complete.

4. Kekkonen: Machiavellian Control Through Foreign Policy

Urho Kekkonen's political career as a politician in leading position is one of authoritarian moves. Still being authoritarian is not enough to being Machiavellian and it is this aspect of him that we are going to analyse. Kekkonen is a very different case compared to de Gaulle in his rise to power, since he was elected to his office legally³⁰ without any crisis. However, in his consolidation of power there are many similarities to that of de Gaulle and it is this consolidation of power part of

24 Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p.380

25 Keeping your subject loyal to you by rewarding them with lesser awards is a traditional method used since time immemorial and Machiavelli also suggested this in one of his chapters. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997) p.89

26 Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman. A Life of General de Gaulle* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ,1993) p.399

27 Minister of Algeria

28 The changing the new constitution so that the people approved of it and making the President to be elected by the people was a cunning move from de Gaulle as it allowed him in a sense to change the government in such a way that it retained some of the old look, which is exactly as Machiavelli advices in *The Discourses*: "He who proposes to change an Old-established Form of government in a Free city should retain at least the Shadow of its Ancient Customs" (p.175)

29 The Council of State objected him claiming his interpretation was illegal , but he managed to get the Constitutional Council to agree with him. Ståhlberg, *De Gaulle, Generalen som var Frankrike* (Norstedts Förlag, 2004) p.447

30 If somewhat questionably with a vote of 151-149.

his career that we are going to concentrate on, which lasted from 1956 to 1975 when he was on the zenith of his power.

4.1. The Two Crises

Both of the crises were important for Kekkonen, because without them he might have been removed from power through elections and it was these crises that would eventually form the cornerstone of his power, namely the threat of USSR and with it he could silence the opposition and make himself irreplaceable to Finland's foreign policy.

The first of these two crises, Night Frost, happened in October 1958 when USSR criticized the Fagerholm government for being too West oriented. It all started when the Soviet Union cut down on its trade with Finland on 7th November 1958. This of course raised the internal tensions in Finland somewhat, but not enough to force the government to resign. The Agrarian Party (Maalaisliitto), however, following Virolainen's example changed its opinion and left the government on the 4th December and the rest of the government followed soon after this. This was not unfortunately enough to change USSR opinion about the government, since the old parties, SDP and Kokoomus,³¹ still tried to form a government that USSR did not approve of. At this point Kekkonen held a speech on the radio (10.12.1958) about the government in creation and the parties involved, which many interpreted as negative as he criticized it for worsening the relations between Finland and USSR. It wasn't long before a minority government was formed under the Agrarian Party (13.01.1959).³²

There are several interpretations why this crisis happened, with views varying between that of foreign caused and that of internally caused. The general conclusion is that it was caused due to both foreign and internal pressure,³³ with USSR's decision to decrease its imports from Finland just a side effect that increased the pressure on the Fagerholm government. The other more critical view towards Kekkonen's role in the affair has been presented by several historians, who claim that it was administered by Kekkonen so that he would have it easier to win in the elections of 1962.³⁴ Still

31 SDP = Social Democratic Party Kokoomus = National Coalition Party

32 Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.178-199

33 Foreign pressure created by USSR and manipulated to some extent by Kekkonen and internal pressure caused by divisions among the parties. Gahmberg, *Kekkonens politik – inrikes- eller utrikespolitiska determinanter?* (Åbo Akademi Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996) p.24-25

34 For example, Rautkallio bases his argument on letters written by Britain's Ambassador Busk and political opponents of Kekkonen. Rautkallio, *Kekkonen ja Moskova. Suomi lännestä nähtynä 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1991) p.237-278

some things have been proved of Kekkonen's role in the affair, which is his involvement in the Agrarian Party's³⁵ decision to resign from the government.³⁶ However, if this extensive manipulation of the events is true, then Kekkonen used the old "Machiavellian" theory of keeping your opponents divided and using internal conflicts to rule.

The second crisis to happen during Kekkonen's era was the Novosibirski's Note Crisis in 1961, just before the presidential elections. He would then eventually be re-elected as a consequence of the crisis. The basis for this event was that the opposition had formed the so called Honka-alliance, which advocated for voting Chancellor of Justice, Olavi Honka, to president. In 1961 he had already gathered enough support from the electors so that he could challenge Kekkonen in the upcoming elections. It has been recognized that Kekkonen was a valuable asset to USSR and that the Politburo wanted him to stay in power,³⁷ so it is no wonder that the USSR sent a note to Finland on the 30th October 1961,³⁸ where it stated that it will immediately summon Finland to military consultations according to the YYA-treaty.³⁹ The need for military consultations, however, was put down on 24.11.1961 when Kekkonen met Khrushchev in Novosibirsk. The result of this crisis was that Honka backed down on his candidature and thus Kekkonen won the upcoming elections (14.2.1962) with 199 votes out of 300, and no strong political opponent would arise to challenge him for a while.⁴⁰

Even of this crisis there is a negative interpretation of Kekkonen, where it is claimed that the note crisis was actually ordered by Kekkonen and that in the end the note was only a political trick, since it has been proved that USSR didn't have any use of Finland in a militaristic way.⁴¹ Regardless of

35 His party of choice, which he relied on to gain support for his foreign policies. Before the Night Frost he had to fight for his influence in the party so that he could once more control it after it had been taken over by his political opponents (for example Virolainen) Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.103-106, 159-163

36 Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.171-183

37 Politburo's own archives include summary's from meetings where the importance of Kekkonen has been discussed and which Rautkallio presents in his book *Novosibirskin Lavastus* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1992) p. 9-16

38 Though it was not the main reason for the note, since USSR was more concerned with the current Germany situation and what role Finland should play in case of war. The note was also a political move in USSR to satisfy its military as the threat of war was actual, but it had also foreign policy functions such as forcing Norway and Denmark to think twice before forming closer bonds with FRG due to Finland's closeness to them. Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.527-529, 543-545, 597-598

39 In the note it was explained that it was necessary to have a meeting due to the increased alertness of the Warsaw Pact, which was caused by increasing tensions in the Cold War(The Berlin Crisis). Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.475-481

40 Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p. 522-530, 532-533,

41 Rautkallio for example has dedicated a whole book, *Novosibirskin Lavastus* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1992), to this theory that Kekkonen ordered the note. This has been countered by many historians such as Suomi, who claims that even if Kekkonen tried to use USSR to improve his chances in the upcoming elections, he was not aware of the note, which was based on the increasing military activity in Germany, and that his reaction of continuing his USA visit was just a logical continuation to his previous policies of not making Finland look like a puppet of Russia.

these interpretations, these two crises played into Kekkonen's hands, with making him too valuable to be removed any more from his position as a president due to his Russia connections and thus allowing him to dominate the political scene in Finland.

4.2. "By alarming them with fears of the enemy's cruelty..."⁴²

The use of the threat of USSR to motivate his actions, was something that Kekkonen used quite commonly, especially when removing political opponents on the pretext that anyone saying against his foreign policies was "inviting the hostility of the Russians". Already the two crises were in a sense manipulated by the USSR threat and later on in 1972, Kekkonen stated that he would not participate in normal presidential elections, but that he would still be available to be the President through other means. Soon the upcoming presidential elections would become linked with Finland's attempt to join EEC, since USSR was against it and the only way to join EEC was through USSR's approval. Thus the President needed to be a person with good ties to USSR, which was Kekkonen in this case and on the 17th November 1973, the parliament ratified a special law that would lengthen Kekkonen's presidency to 1978 instead of 1974. Even in this case was the threat of USSR prominent.⁴³ Two years later (29.5.1975) he was forced to dissolve the entire parliament with USSR being one of the reasons and the other ones being the high inflation rate that the government could not deal with and Ahti Karjalainen's provocative propaganda for the presidential elections of 1978. In a similar way, several political writers were censured for their negative opinions, with USSR being used as a pretext.⁴⁴

Suomi also counters in a similar way the speculations about Kekkonen ordering the note during Brezhnev's visit in late September 1961 by presenting facts about the Brezhnev's travel arrangements in Finland and his relations to Kekkonen. In general he questions the validity of all Rautkallio's arguments including his evidence that the KGB had shown Kekkonen drafts about the note with the purpose of securing his re-election and the validity of the source (Golitsyn). Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1992) p.435-437, 482-483, 549-550

42 Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature 1997) p.42

43 Even though in the beginning most of the parties were divided on the special law issue, which would have meant that it would not have been passed in the parliament. As it is, the pressure put by USSR on the EEC issue and the fact that Kekkonen told that he would resign due to the Zavidovo-memorandum, forced the different bickering parties to agree on accepting the special law, since most of them agreed on the fact that to get through the EEC agreement with the consent of USSR, Kekkonen had to be the president due to the fact that USSR trusted him (even after the Zavidovo-memorandum at the end of October 1972). Suomi, *Liennytyksen akanvirrassa. Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1998) p. 83-143. What is peculiar to this case is that Kekkonen used the method of external threat to get re-elected even if it was not his purpose as Suomi presents, since his decision to resign was purely realpolitik as he believed that the leakage had caused harm to Finland's relations to USSR and as such he had to resign to get the trust back. Realpolitik as we know has a lot in common with Machiavellism.

44 In a sense he got rid of Karjalainen in a true Machiavellian way, as Karjalainen had turned out to be a rival a couple of years of before the dismissal of the government. Karjalainen used in his propaganda in 1975 a note where he claimed that USSR agreed with him that there was no hurry to organize premature parliamentary elections (he hoped to play a prominent role in the minority government that would be created if there was no premature elections). USSR did however condemn this saying that it trusted in Kekkonen's opinion of organizing new elections. Suomi, *Liennytyksen akanvirrassa. Urho Kekkonen 1972-1976* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1998) p.492-493, 632-657

All of these methods used by Kekkonen were Machiavellian, since he got rid of political opponents by putting them out from important positions for a while. Then there is the use of USSR as a threat, which is extremely Machiavellian as Machiavelli himself has written that to keep internal order you have to put the attention of the masses on an external threat among others things.⁴⁵

4.3. Propaganda and Reputation

It is not then surprising that Kekkonen used propaganda that was related to the Russia threat to discredit political opponents and to gain the public opinion behind his decisions.⁴⁶ Especially this can be seen in the early times of his presidency when he tried to solidify his position, for example in the Night Frost crisis, his speech was the factor that tipped the scale so that SDP and Kokoomus had to give up the attempts of forming a new government after the previous had been forced to resign. Connected to this propaganda is also Kekkonen's reputation and in which he succeeded perfectly. He made himself to be seen both in Finland and elsewhere as a vital link between the western powers and USSR, which in turn kept him in power. Even here he followed Machiavelli's guidelines that reputation is everything if you want to stay in power.

5. Conclusion

Both Kekkonen and de Gaulle used Machiavellian methods as has been shown, with de Gaulle practicing it very much during his rise to power and his first years as president after which his use of Machiavellian methods declined. Then we have on the other hand Kekkonen, who rose to power through normal means and started then to use Machiavellian methods in ever increasing amounts as he consolidated his powers. What they have in common is that they were both authoritarian rulers who ruled during the Cold War when extraordinary means were needed.

So how do they fill the requirements of the model? De Gaulle is according to the model very Machiavellian in his rise to power due to his manipulation and the threat of force while Kekkonen does not have anything that can be attributed to this category. In the second part of the model, the consolidation of power, these gentlemen have more in common in terms of Machiavellism. Both of

⁴⁵ The other ones being encouraging people to believe in the ruler and the other being to reassure those who criticize the ruler the most. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature 1997) p.42

⁴⁶ Gahmberg, *Kekkonens politik – inrikes- eller utrikespolitiska determinanter?* (Åbo Akademi Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996) p.24

them used extensive propaganda in the media to gain public support and to increase their reputation. The sacking of political opponents were used by both of them and in de Gaulle's case he even removed some of his allies in a true Machiavellian manner from power. But it is Kekkonen who is in the end stronger in this area of Machiavellism, as he also used methods like external threat and pure manipulation of the political parties, with the purpose of causing division among the parties,⁴⁷ which made it easier for him to rule. Even the sheer amount of times that Kekkonen used Machiavellian methods is greater than de Gaulle's.

The general question remains however, were they Machiavellian and who was more if they were? First we have to consider what makes a person Machiavellian, is it just the use of the methods or is it first then when you use them repeatedly? I personally fall for the later one, since one action or a couple of actions are not just enough. So in this light we can conclude that both of them were Machiavellian, since they both used those methods more than once, though in the case of de Gaulle you might put a question mark at the end, since his use of those methods declined over time while Kekkonen continued with his Realpolitik/Machiavellian line. One fact can at least be conclude from this model, and that is the fact that Kekkonen was more Machiavellian than de Gaulle when you look at the whole picture and how he satisfies the conditions of the model.

What should be remembered, is that this model is based on the more neutral view of Machiavellism that was introduced by political scientist such as Quentin Skinner and Friedrich Meinecke,⁴⁸ and as such the cases in question might not be Machiavellian in the more traditional sense, if you only take into account the use of ruthless and questionable methods.⁴⁹

47 Classical example of Machiavellism, since Machiavelli favoured internal division when ruling in peaceful times.

48 Both of these authors show how a certain morale can be found in Machiavelli's advices and that the basic idea behind Machiavelli's thoughts was the idea of necessity (Meinecke) and thus Raison d'Etat can be seen as "pure" Machiavellism in sense. When taking this into consideration, it easy to come to a conclusion that Machiavellism is more than just the brutal methods that he introduced/recorded and as such any actions that have been taken to "preserve the state" be it by taking power from a weak government or otherwise, can be seen as Machiavellian.

49 What should be also noted that this model covered mostly domestic actions of these rulers and expanding the model to foreign policies could bring forth more views about whether Kekkonen and de Gaulle were Machiavellian or not. There are already several books that only cover the foreign policies of these rulers in more depth such as Hyvärinen's *Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilua* (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 2000) and Backlund's *Profilen de Gaulle* (Bengt Forsbergs Förlag, 1967) that speculate about the importance of their policies and how they affected each country. In a similar way the view about Kekkonen and de Gaulle could perhaps change if we change the model also to how they maintained their power.

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